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This paper re-examines the so-called coexistence puzzle in terms
of a modiﬁed version of the legal restrictions hypothesis initially put
forth by Bryant and Wallace (1980). The modiﬁcation is in terms
of dropping a questionable assumption in the original hypothesis; i.e.,
that large denomination government bonds cannot be intermediated by
private banks. This restriction is replaced by one that is arguably more
palatable; i.e., that the intermediated monetary instruments created
by private banks are not universally acceptable as payment for all
exchanges (unlike government money). The friction that gives rise to
this latter restriction is one that is commonly employed in monetary
models where ﬁat money is essential for exchange.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The principle of no-arbitrage asserts that any two assets with identical risk
characteristics should earn identical rates of return, if they are to be held
willingly in the wealth portfolios of individuals. As is well known, this stark
prediction appears to be inconsistent with the rate of return diﬀerential
that normally exists between government-issued money and other types of
ﬁnancial instruments that may conceivab l yb eu s e da sp a y m e n ti n s t r u m e n t s .
∗Ih a v eb e n e ﬁted from conversations with Gabriele Camera, Bruce Champ, Steve Eas-
ton, Angela Redish, Robert Reed, Nick Rowe, Shouyong Shi, David Skeie, James Thomp-
son and Randall Wright. Helpful criticisms were also received from seminar participants
at Carleton University and participants at the conference on Money, Banking, and Eco-
nomic Development held at the University of Notre Dame (October 2004). Funding for
this project was provided by SSHRC Canada.
1This discrepancy between theory and observation is referred in what follows
as the coexistence puzzle.
The coexistence puzzle is sometimes framed in terms of (ﬁat) money vis-
à-vis higher-return assets in general (presumably with similar risk charac-
teristics), including capital or titles to capital; e.g., Wallace (2003).1 While
no private security shares exactly in the risk characteristics of government
money, some securities appear to come suﬃciently close; for example, the
demand deposit liabilities of modern chartered banks, which are typically
redeemable (at par) in government money (and largely insured by the gov-
ernment). Of course, demandable bank liabilities, which these days take
the form of electronic credits, do ‘circulate’ (from account to account) as
the main payment instrument in any well-developed economy. As well, this
type of money typically pays interest. Nevertheless, government money
(which, in paper form, pays no interest) continues to coexist with bank
money. Understanding why this might be the case is an interesting question
(and is addressed below); but such an understanding would not constitute
full answer to the coexistence puzzle.
The more challenging dimension to the coexistence puzzle is in terms
of explaining the coexistence of government money and government bonds.
Or, to put it more precisely, the coexistence of two debt instruments, each
of which is issued by the same government (ignoring the fact that separate
government agencies may be involved), each with (virtually) identical nom-
inal risk characteristics, but with only one of the two instruments yielding
interest. On the surface at least, bonds appear to weakly dominate money
in every dimension. And yet, like bank money, bonds are not universally (or
even widely) accepted in payment for goods and services. Why is this the
case?
The common explanation for the coexistence puzzle is that money is a
‘special’ type of asset. In particular, money provides nonpecuniary ‘liquid-
ity’ services that makes it a preferred method of payment relative to other
types of assets. This is the basic idea behind any model that generates a de-
mand for money by assuming that money enters into the utility (or shopping
time) function or by assuming that some purchases are subject to a cash-in-
advance constraint. While these ‘short-cut’ methods have their uses, they
are ill-suited for the question at hand since they essentially assume away the
1Wallace (2003) credits Hicks (1935) with being the ﬁrst to recognize the issue at hand.
But this is not quite right, at least if the coexistence question is framed in terms of two
assets with identical risk characteristics. In Hick’s (1935) analysis, the risk characteristics
of capital appears to play an important role in determining the demand for money.
2coexistence puzzle. Here, I take the view that any satisfactory explanation
should be couched in terms of a model with a physical environment that
renders money essential for trade; i.e., see Kocherlakota (1998).
An early attempt at explaining coexistence is the ‘legal restrictions’ hy-
pothesis put forth by Bryant and Wallace (1980) and Wallace (1983). This
hypothesis has been attacked on the basis of the empirical validity of its
underlying assumptions (which presumably accounts for why the theory ap-
pears to have fallen out of favor). But I argue below that a modiﬁed version
of this hypothesis can provide a compelling explanation for coexistence. The
modiﬁcation is in terms of dropping a questionable assumption in the orig-
inal hypothesis; i.e., that large denomination government bonds cannot be
intermediated by private banks. This restriction is replaced by one that is
arguably more palatable; i.e., that the intermediated monetary instruments
created by private banks are not universally acceptable as payment for all
exchanges (unlike government money). The friction that gives rise to this
latter restriction is one that is commonly employed in monetary models
where ﬁat money is essential for exchange.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I brieﬂy review the original
legal restrictions hypothesis and critically evaluate the objections put forth
against it. In Section 3, I lay out the basic framework of my own model
without government bonds to highlight the role played by money in this en-
vironment and to provide an explanation for the coexistence puzzle between
money and private assets. Section 4 then introduces government bonds and
examines the conditions under which coexistence prevails between money
and bonds. Section 5 discusses the general results and relates them to some
recent competing explanations. Section 6 concludes.
2L e g a l R e s t r i c t i o n s
One of the ﬁrst explanations for the coexistence puzzle is the ‘legal re-
strictions’ hypothesis put forth by Bryant and Wallace (1980) and Wallace
(1983). In the overlapping generations model that they consider, money and
bonds naturally earn the same rate of return. However, the authors high-
light two features of the environment that may prevent this from happening.
First, negotiable bearer bonds tend to be issued in very large denominations.
Second, legal restrictions prevent banks from issuing low denomination ban-
knotes, which prevents the intermediation of large denomination government
debt.
3The large denomination property of government debt is only a neces-
sary and not suﬃcient condition. In particular, a proﬁt maximizing bank
could exploit an existing arbitrage opportunity by issuing its own small de-
nomination notes that are fully backed by large denomination government
bonds. Competition among banks would presumably drive the return on
private banknotes in line with the return on bonds (with perhaps a small
diﬀerential to cover the costs of intermediation). For any strictly positive
interest rate, the demand for non-interest bearing money should then fall
to zero. The legal restriction on the issuance of private banknotes is what
prevents this from happening.
The legal restrictions hypothesis has been challenged by those who ques-
tion the empirical validity of its two underlying assumptions. First, numer-
ous authors have pointed out the fact that historically, many governments
have attempted to circulate ‘small’ denomination interest-bearing bonds.
For example, over the period 1915—27, the government of France issued bons
(interest-bearing treasury debt) in denominations as low as 100 Francs; see
Makinen and Woodward (1986). Despite their many attractive features, bons
did not drive Bank of France notes out of circulation. Makinen and Wood-
ward argue that the bons episode in France provides evidence that overturns
one of the underlying assumptions of the legal restrictions hypothesis.
But there is reason to doubt this claim. Evidently, the lowest denom-
ination bon was 100 Francs, which by my own calculation is equivalent to
roughly 100 USD today. Other indirect evidence suggesting that the bon
was a larger denomination note is the fact that it was readily used in larger
transactions (e.g., real estate). Thus, I do not believe that one can conclude,
as Makinen and Woodward claim, that bons were suitable for ‘everyday ex-
change.’ The same can be said of the ‘low’ denomination interest bearing
treasury bills issued by both the Northern and Southern governments in the
United States during the civil war; see Burdekin and Weidenmier (2002).
During this episode, the minimum denomination interest-bearing note issued
was $5, which again is approximately the equivalent of 100 USD today.
Let me dwell for a moment on the issue of denomination, since it plays
an important role in my own explanation. First, there appears to be no
compelling evidence to suggest that governments have ever issued interest-
bearing currency in the range of denominations that were available in their
non-interest-bearing counterparts. Thus, to the extent that individuals ﬁnd
low denomination money convenient, it is not surprising to learn that the
issuance of interest-bearing money in ‘intermediate’ denominations did not
4drive non-interest-bearing money out of circulation. On the other hand,
a somewhat subtler issue remains. In particular, why does it appear that
interest-bearing money coexisted with non-interest-bearing notes of identical
denomination? I will return to this question in the sequel; but for now will
conclude that the assertion of large denomination bond-issue appears to be
an empirically valid assumption.
The more problematic feature of the legal restrictions hypothesis is the
assertion that banks are legally prohibited from issuing their own small
denomination notes, thereby preventing them from intermediating large de-
nomination bonds. We know of historical episodes in which this assumption
appears, on the surface at least, to be invalid. For example, during the so-
called ‘free-banking’ era in the United States (1836—63), most states passed
laws making it relatively easy to establish a state bank and issue ‘low’ denom-
ination notes.2 While banks did intermediate government bonds, the notes
they issued (redeemable in specie) generally did not pay interest. Similarly,
during the Scottish free banking system (1716—1864), while Scottish banks
were not prohibited from issuing ‘low’ denomination interest bearing notes
(again, redeemable in specie), they evidently chose not to (although they
did pay interest on demand deposit accounts); e.g., see White (1987). The
fact that zero interest notes (and specie) coexisted with higher yielding se-
curities in these eras of relatively free banking casts some doubt on the legal
restrictions hypothesis. On the other hand, Rolnick and Weber (1982) and
Cowan and Kroszner (1989) forcefully point out that these so-called ‘free-
banking’ eras operated in highly regulated regimes. For example, Scottish
banks were prohibited from issuing notes in denominations lower than £1
(worth approximately 200 USD today).
In my view, however, perhaps the clearest evidence that contradicts the
second assumption of the legal restrictions hypothesis is to be found in
modern economies with well-developed electronic payment systems. While
banks do not issue low denomination payment instruments in paper form
(either willingly or by legal restriction), they can and do issue highly di-
visible interest-bearing demand deposits that these days are essentially the
electronic equivalent of privately issued interest bearing paper notes. Unlike
the banknotes of old, which were made redeemable for specie, the electronic
bank money of today is made redeemable for government-issued zero interest
paper notes (cash). Thus, in the context of present day economies, the coex-
istence puzzle may be framed as asking why cash continues to coexist with
2Shortly after the National Banking Act of 1863, a 10% tax was imposed on banknotes
and they quickly disappeared from circulation.
5what appears to be a dominant monetary instrument (i.e., interest-bearing
demand liabilities that are safely backed, in part, by government bonds).
In the model I develop below, I maintain the assumption that government
interest bearing debt is issued in large denominations, making it unsuitable
for ‘everyday’ payments. But I dispense with the assumption that legal re-
strictions prevent banks from intermediating large denomination bonds. In
the model below, banks can and do intermediate bonds by issuing a highly
divisible ‘electronic’ interest bearing payment instrument. I replace the legal
restriction with what is arguably a more plausible assumption: That there
is a less than complete public record of individual trading histories. This
assumption implies that privately-issued debt instruments are not univer-
sally accepted for all types of payments—a restriction that makes ﬁat money
essential for trade. Eﬃciency in this environment entails the emergence of
banks whose assets constitute cash, bonds and loans; and whose interest-
bearing liabilities must be made redeemable on demand for cash. Bonds
earn interest because they must compete with capital in the wealth port-
folios of individuals. Non-interest bearing cash is valued for its ability to
facilitate exchange in trading opportunities where the seller cannot easily
verify the legitimacy of the buyer’s bank instrument (e.g., a check drawn on
a non-local bank) or where the seller does not have access to a centralized
payment system (which prevents a debit-card transaction).
3T h e B a s i c M o d e l
The model developed here is similar to one developed by Smith (2003) and
Andolfatto (2003). Consider an economy consisting of two separate ‘loca-
tions’ A and B. Of course, one need not interpret ‘locations’ literally as
being spatially separated. The key assumption is that the trading histories
of an agent (or agency) belonging to A are not observable by those agents
(or agencies) belonging to B; and vice-versa. This restriction on the environ-
ment implies that private liabilities issued in location A are not recognized
in location B (and vice-versa). Each location is populated by Nt young
agents at date t =1 ,2,...,∞ who live for two periods. There is an initial old
generation N0 in each location. Let n denote the (gross) rate of population
growth.
Each young agent is relocated to the ‘other’ location with probability
0 <π<1. One can interpret this event as the probability of being con-
fronted with a trading opportunity in which the buyer and seller (and their
6respective banks) are anonymous to each other (so that privately-issued li-
abilities are not an acceptable form of payment). In what follows, I will
refer to π as the probability of a ‘liquidity shock.’ Assume that this liquid-
ity shock is private information. Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, π
also represents the fraction of young agents making a transition to a ‘for-
eign’ location. Hence, the young (in location A) have an expected utility
function:
U =( 1− π)u(cA)+πu(cB), (1)
where u0 > 0 >u 00 and cj denotes consumption in location j = A,B (the
young in location B have similar preferences).
Young individuals are endowed with y>0 units of output. There is
an investment technology that takes k units of current output and delivers
xk units of future output, where x>n .The investment choice must be
made before the realization of the liquidity shock. Assume that capital is
too costly to scrap so that it cannot be transported across locations. As
well, assume that capital depreciates fully after yielding its return. Young
agents only care about consumption when old (so that they save their entire
endowment).
Since capital cannot be scrapped and since private liabilities are not
accepted in foreign locations, there is a role for ﬁat money. Assume that
t h ei n i t i a lo l do fe a c hl o c a t i o na r ee n d o w e dw i t has t o c ko fﬁat money M.
The supply of money is held constant over time, so that it earns a real
(gross) return equal to n. Note that money will be valued (for its insurance
properties) despite being dominated in rate of return.
Since the young save their entire endowment, the only relevant choice is
over the composition of their savings; i.e., money (q) or capital (k). Since
the portfolio decision must be made before an agent experiences a liquidity
shock, the young have incentive to form a coalition (which I will call a
bank). The bank takes deposits y, which it uses to purchase money (from
the old), investing the remainder in the location speciﬁc capital project. The
private information friction is easily circumvented by making bank deposits
redeemable in ﬁat money on demand. Thus, the bank’s balance sheet will
consist of government money (cash) and private loans (capital investment)
on the asset side; and demandable liabilities on the liability side.
Formally, the bank’s choice problem is to maximize (1) subject to:
(1 − π)cA + πcB ≤ xk + nq;
πcB ≤ nq;
7where q + k = y.
Since x>n ,the second constraint will bind (since there is no aggregate
uncertainty, the bank’s cash reserves can be chosen so that they are just
suﬃcient to meet expected withdrawals). In this case, the equilibrium real












Note that the nominal interest rate is positive; i.e. (x/n) > 1. Andolfatto
(2003) demonstrates that holding the stock of money constant is an optimal
monetary policy (from the perspective of a representative young generation).
In other words, the Friedman rule is not optimal in this environment.3 The
intuition is straightforward. While generating a deﬂation to equate the
return on capital and money (i.e., the Friedman rule) has the beneﬁto fp r o -
viding full insurance, this gain is more than oﬀset by the implied contraction
in capital spending (as the high rate of return on money induces banks to
divert deposits away from business loans and into ﬁat money).
The model developed above provides a partial answer to the coexis-
tence puzzle; i.e., when the puzzle is fram e di nt e r m so fn o n - i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g
money and capital (or titles to capital in the form of fully backed bank lia-
bilities). But the more challenging aspect of the coexistence puzzle pertains
to the coexistence of government money and bonds. The next section intro-
duces government bonds and demonstrates the conditions under which the
coexistence of these two ﬁnancial instruments may occur.
4 Government Bonds
There is an outstanding stock of nominal government bonds B that are in
the hands of the initial old. Assume that these bonds have no maturity date,
but that they are transferable (across generations) and pay a nominal (gross)
interest rate R. The government’s policy is to maintain a ﬁxed bond/money
ratio θ ≡ (B/M). Interest payments on debt are ﬁnanced with a lump-sum
tax on bond-holders.
Let b denote the real bond holdings per young agent. Then the bank’s
choice problem is to maximize (1) subject to:
3At least, from a class of policies that expands/contracts the supply of money at some
constant rate and injected/withdrawn with lump-sum transfers/taxes.
8(1 − π)cA + πcB ≤ xk + Rnb + nq − τ;
πcB ≤ nq;
q + k = y.
where τ is a lump-sum tax. Note that this speciﬁcation assumes that gov-
ernment bonds are issued in suﬃciently large denominations that prohibit
bank money from being redeemable in government bonds (when I go to the
bank machine, the ATM spits out non-interesting bearing cash, not small
denomination notes of interest-bearing government debt).4
If bonds are to compete with capital, the nominal interest rate must be
such that R∗ =( x/n) > 1. Note that since the equilibrium price level falls
at rate n, both bonds and capital earn the same real return x. In this case,
the bank is indiﬀerent between bonds and capital, so that s ≡ b+k = y−q.
As well, since money is dominated in rate of return, we have πcB = nq.The
the bank’s choice problem is therefore given by:
max
q (1 − π)u
µ








The demand for real money balances is characterized by:
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From the government’s budget constraint:
τ =( x − 1)b.
Since θ ≡ b/q, we can alternatively write this constraint as:
τ =( x − 1)θq.
Substituting this constraint into condition (2) yields a condition that char-
acterizes the equilibrium real money balances:
xu0
µ









4If bonds are issued in small denominations, then the second constraint would be given
by:
πcB ≤ xb + nq.
In this case, money would be driven out of circulation.
9Note that if θ =0 , then the model reduces to the earlier speciﬁcation.
Let me now summarize the pattern of trades in this economy. The
‘initial’ old are endowed with M dollars of currency and B dollars of interest
bearing debt. After paying the lump sum tax (that ﬁnances the interest cost
of outstanding government bonds), the initial old are left with M+B dollars.
Banks collect deposits from each of the initial young (consisting of claims
against y). A portion of these claims are used to purchase the M +B dollars
of government debt instruments from the old. (Notice here that both money
and bonds ‘circulate’ as equivalent payment instruments at this stage). The
remainder of these claims are used to ﬁnance capital investment.
Thus, on the asset side of its balance sheet, the bank holds government
cash, government bonds, and private loans (claims against the economy’s
capital stock). Eﬃciency dictates that the liability side of the bank’s bal-
ance sheet consist of demandable debt (demand deposits). One can think of
demandable debt consisting of electronic transactions balances that can be
redeemed on demand for government cash. These demandable debt instru-
ments serve as a private money instrument. If depositors choose to exercise
the redemption option (i.e., withdraw funds early), then they receive govern-
ment cash but earn no interest on their savings. Depositors who carry their
savings at the bank into the future period use the principal and interest to
purchase future output.
After the realization of individual liquidity shocks in the current period,
the bank’s cash balances are drained entirely by those who need to exercise
the redemption option on their demand deposits. This cash is taken to the
‘foreign’ location where it is used to purchase output in the future period.
Of course, there is an equal amount of cash arriving in the ‘domestic’ loca-
tion from the young on the ‘foreign’ location who exercised the redemption
option on their demand deposits. Thus, the total supply of government cash
remains constant in each location.
As time unfolds, the young become old. Those that have cash, purchase
claims to output (issued by the new bank that arises in that period). Those
that still have their bank money use it to purchase output. Some of this
output consists of the return to capital investment and some of this output
consists of the endowment brought into the period by the new generation
of young agents. This latter output is purchased by selling B dollars of
government bonds (the amount remaining after satisfying the tax obligation)
to the bank representing the new generation of young agents. The pattern
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5 Discussion
In the model developed above, interest-bearing government debt coexists
with non-interest-bearing government money, despite the fact that private
intermediaries are not legally restricted from issuing small denomination
banknotes. The model does not explain why the government would want to
issue large denomination interest-bearing debt. But given that it does, the
model here explains the interest premium as follows:
1. Government bonds are issued in large denominations, so that ATMs
11cannot discharge low-denomination government notes that pay inter-
est;
2. While banks can and do intermediate large denomination government
notes by issuing private liabilities that are backed by government
bonds, these private liabilities are not an acceptable form of payment
in some transactions (e.g., when I try to pay for groceries in New York
with a check drawn on my bank in San Francisco).
Given that history appears to provide no examples of governments that
have issued interest-bearing notes in the range of denominations available in
their non-interest bearing counterparts, the theory developed above suggests
that the coexistence of money and bonds should not be surprising. Likewise,
the theory predicts that should the U.S. Treasury begin to issue interest-
bearing notes in denominations as low as $1, they would drive current U.S.
Federal Reserve notes out of circulation. This prediction does not appear to
be all that crazy (to me, at least).
There remains, however, a subtler dimension to the coexistence puzzle,
as alluded to earlier; namely, the coexistence of money and bonds of identical
denominations (e.g., a 100 Franc Bank of France note and a 100 Franc bon).
To explain this phenomenon, one needs to dispense with the assumption that
the primary diﬀerence between money and bonds is in their denomination.
Aiyagari, Wallace and Wright (1996) examine the issue of coexistence
in the context of a search-theoretic model of money that abstracts from
denomination issues. According to these authors, bonds may trade at a
discount if (for some unexplained reason) the government refuses to accept
bonds as payment for government produced goods and services. In this
random-matching environment then, holding bonds entails some exchange
risk (despite the fact that they are free of default risk).
While these authors do not elaborate on whether the behavioral assump-
tion they assume corresponds in any way to actual government practice, it in
fact may appear to be the case. In particular, an almost universal property
of all government money is that it constitutes lawful (or legal) tender;s e e
Breckenridge (1903).5 The phenomenon is too pervasive to be interpreted as
mere coincidence or irrelevant custom; i.e., see Smith (1936). It seems more
likely to suppose that this legal provision has at least some bite; i.e., at least
5Evidently, there is a distinction to be made between lawful and legal tender. The
former has the power to discharge a debt obligation to the government; whereas the latter
has the legal power to discharge debts in general (both public and private).
12some payments at some level need (by legal decree) to be settled in terms
of the economy’s lawful tender. Thus, the probability of meeting a ‘govern-
ment agent’ in Aiyagari, Wallace and Wright (1996) might reasonably be
interpreted as an event that requires payment in the form of government-
issued money (rather than bonds). In reality, this event may correspond to
the stage in which tax obligations are ultimately settled in an economy.6
In fact, the Aiyagari, Wallace and Wright (1996) hypothesis is not in-
consistent with the model developed above where π is reinterpreted to be
the probability of being thrust in a situation that requires payment in lawful
tender. As far as I can tell, there have been no historical cases in which risk-
free interest-bearing government securities have been bestowed with lawful
tender status.7 In particular, unlike the notes issued by the Bank of France,
bons were not made lawful tender. The key to understanding the coex-
istence puzzle then appears to be in recognizing that risk-free bonds are
discriminated against along some dimension relative to money (i.e., either
in denomination size, as I have emphasized; or in legal status, as in one
interpretation of the Aiyagari, Wallace and Wright setup).8
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, I have argued that the coexistence puzzle can be understood
in terms of a modiﬁed version of the legal restrictions hypothesis initially put
forth by Bryant and Wallace (1980). The modiﬁcation is in terms of drop-
ping a questionable assumption made by the original hypothesis; i.e., that
large denomination government bonds cannot be intermediated by private
6To the extent that the legal tender status of government money has bite, one might
question whether ‘unbacked’ government money should in fact be interpreted as ﬁat, since
a legal tender note has the power to discharge a real tax obligation; see Goldberg (2004).
On the issue of whether a purely ﬁat money has ever existed at all, see Goldberg (2003).
7The ‘risk-free’ qualiﬁer is important here. In 2001, a regional government in Ar-
gentina issued an interest-bearing note (called the patacon) that the federal government
evidently claimed would be acceptable in the discharge of tax obligations. However, being
a provincially-issued note, it is unlikely that such bills were viewed as free of nominal risk.
8Another possibility, not emphasized above, is that money and bonds do not share
precisely the same risk characteristics. In particular, money is issued by a central bank
and represents a (nominally) risk-free claim against itself, whereas bonds are issued by a
separate agency (e.g., the Treasury), representing low-risk claims against money. In the
event of a ﬁscal crisis (however remote), the Treasury may be compelled to pay pennies
on the dollar for its outstanding debt. Certainly, there are enough historical precedents
to suggest that this may be a real possibility.
13banks. This restriction is replaced by one that is arguably more palatable;
i.e., that the intermediated monetary instruments created by private banks
are not universally acceptable as payment for all exchanges (unlike govern-
ment money). The friction that gives rise to this latter restriction is one that
is commonly employed in monetary models where ﬁat money is essential for
exchange.
There have been, of course, other attempts at explaining coexistence.
For example, Shi (2003) considers an environment similar to Aiyagari, Wal-
lace and Wright (1996) where matured bonds (indistinguishable from ﬁat
money) are driven from circulation and newly-issued bonds trade at a dis-
count owing to a temporary separation between product and asset markets.
Zhu and Wallace (2003) view coexistence as one of many possible equilib-
rium outcomes that may occur in bilateral exchanges involving goods and
two ‘outside’ assets (money and bonds). An equilibrium with coexistence
appears to rely on the idea that there may be a ‘convention’ (an equilibrium
selection) such that a buyer’s bargaining power is increased with the amount
of cash (as opposed to bonds) brought into an exchange. In this equilibrium,
individuals are willing to hold cash (which is dominated in rate of return)
since it allows them to extract a greater fraction of the surplus associated in
any exchange opportunity. Camera, Noussair and Tucker (undated) ﬁnd in
experimental economies that a dominated ﬁnancial instrument may coexist
if it has a history of use as a payment instrument prior to the introduction
of a higher return security.
As of today, there is still no consensus on what features of the economic
environment (or government policies) are responsible for the coexistence
puzzle. Future research directed at developing a clearer understanding of
coexistence is important for two reasons. First, monetary policy is typ-
ically implemented by way of swaps of non-interest and interest-bearing
government securities. Understanding what drives the wedge between such
government securities may be important for understanding the underlying
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Second, features of the envi-
ronment that give rise to coexistence may ultimately play a role in the design
of an optimal monetary policy.
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